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THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES IN 
PATENT MONOPOLIES: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT APPLIES ANTITRUST 
SCRUTINY TO NO-AG PATENT 
SETTLEMENTS IN SMITHKLINE 
Abstract: On June 26, 2015, in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Bee-
cham Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that no-
authorized generic agreements (“no-AG agreements”), in which a pioneer phar-
maceutical manufacturer agrees not to introduce a generic drug, are subject to an-
titrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act. This Comment argues that the Third Cir-
cuit correctly extended the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Actavis to non-cash settlement agreements. In Actavis, the Court held 
that a “reverse-payment settlement,” which compensates a generic manufacturer 
to delay market entry, creates monopolistic consequences and is subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. To rule otherwise would deter manufacturers from introducing ge-
neric drugs into the pharmaceutical market and, consequently, restrict the amount 
of lower cost generic drugs available to consumers. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Smithkline Beecham Corp., doing business as GlaxoSmithKline 
(“GSK”), a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer, settled a patent in-
fringement lawsuit with Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (“Teva”), a generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer.1 Under the terms of the settlement agreement, 
the brand manufacturer agreed not to introduce an authorized generic (agreed 
to a “no-AG agreement”) for a limited period of time.2 In effect, the no-AG 
agreement reduced the number of possible generics available from two—
                                                                                                                           
 1 King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 397 (3d Cir. 2015). 
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) initiated the litigation to challenge Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 
(“Teva”)’s attempt to market a generic version of the drug before GSK’s patent expired. Id. at 396. 
Because the litigation settled, GSK’s patent retained its original expiration: July of 2008. Id. 
 2 Id. at 397 (noting that GSK agreed not to market its authorized generic for a 180-day period of 
exclusivity). Although GSK brought the infringement suit against Teva, GSK risked losing its patent 
to Teva’s validity defense. See id. (noting that GSK lost its chief patent claim). An authorized generic 
is a generic drug that the brand manufacturer sells. Thomas Chen, Note, Authorized Generics: A Pre-
scription for Hatch-Waxman Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. 459, 460 (2007). When parties sign an agree-
ment not to market an authorized generic (a “no-AG agreement”), the brand manufacturer agrees not 
to market its own generic during the period of exclusivity granted to the first-filing generic manufac-
turer. Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 
596 (2015). 
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Teva’s and GSK’s— to one—Teva’s alone.3 In exchange, GSK avoided Teva’s 
patent validity challenge and, consequently, retained the exclusive right to 
market its brand-name drug for the completion of the patent term.4 
In 2015, in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the no-AG 
agreement was subject to antitrust scrutiny.5 The Third Circuit relied on the 
United States Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Actavis to reach its conclusion.6 In Actavis, the Supreme Court held that a “re-
verse payment settlement,” where a brand pays the generic to delay entering 
the market, adversely affects competition and should be evaluated according to 
antitrust principles.7 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Michele M. Kang, ANDA Reverse Payments and the Post-Actavis Landscape, 8 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 73, 79 (2016) (explaining that no-AG agreements limit the number of possible ge-
neric drugs offered from two—authorized generic and generic—to one—generic). Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a first-filing generic drug manufacturer is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period, to be 
shared only with the brand-name manufacturer’s authorized generic. See Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)) (providing a 180-day period of exclusivity to the first-filing ge-
neric manufacturer, but permitting the pioneer drug manufacturer to market its authorized generic 
drug during this time); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (noting the 
180-day period of exclusivity excludes competition from other generic manufacturers, but does not 
prevent the brand manufacturer from introducing its own generic, known as an authorized generic).  
 4 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. Had Teva won the patent suit in court in February of 2005, Teva 
would have been entitled to a first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period, shared with GSK, beginning on 
the day of the decision. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 430 (2011) (not-
ing that the 180-day market exclusivity period commences at the earlier of a court decision regarding 
the validity of the patent or the date generic manufacturers enter the market). After this period, any 
later-filing generic manufacturer whose Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) had been 
approved would have been allowed entry into the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (providing 180-day 
period of exclusivity to the first to file an ANDA); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 396 (stating that no other 
generic can enter during this exclusivity period); Kelly, supra, at 424 (noting that the FDA reviews 
subsequent ANDA applications after the completion of the 180-day period). In the end, the market 
would have opened in June of 2005. Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. Under the settlement agreement, the 
market remained closed to all manufacturers other than GSK and Teva during GSK’s patent term and 
Teva’s subsequent 180-day exclusivity period, ultimately opening in January of 2009. Id. 
 5 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 409 (stating that the settlement agreement creates a monopoly and con-
sumers pay in the form of higher prices); see also Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)) (prohibiting contracts or conspiracies that restrain 
or monopolize trade). Antitrust law protects consumers from anticompetitive arrangements in the 
marketplace. See A. Michael Ferrill et al., Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 SMU L. REV. 669, 
670–71 (2007) (finding that antitrust laws are designed to promote competition between market play-
ers and prohibit price-fixing, so consumers benefit in the form of lower prices). 
 6 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (noting that patent set-
tlements can sometimes violate antitrust laws); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 403 (applying the Actavis rule 
to find anticompetitive consequences in the no-AG agreement). 
 7 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237 (holding that the legality of a settlement where the brand 
pays a large and unjustified cash payment to the generic manufacturer to delay market entry should be 
evaluated with antitrust and patent law). 
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This Comment argues that the Third Circuit correctly extended the Ac-
tavis holding to include non-cash settlements because both forms of settle-
ments represent a potential unreasonable restraint of trade.8 Part I of this 
Comment discusses the legislative purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act and re-
views the factual and procedural history of Smithkline.9 Part II explains the 
legal landscape set forth in Actavis and examines the Smithkline holding in 
light of the Actavis decision.10 Finally, Part III argues that the Third Circuit 
correctly interpreted Congress’s intent by holding that non-cash patent settle-
ments are subject to antitrust scrutiny.11 
I. ENSURING ACCESS TO LOW COST PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act (popularly the “Hatch-Waxman Act”) in 1984 to protect consumers from 
excessive pharmaceutical prices.12 By reducing the time and costs associated 
with introducing a generic drug, Congress hoped to encourage generic manufac-
turers to enter the market sooner.13 The pro-competitive aim of the Hatch-
Waxman Act saves consumers billions of dollars in pharmaceutical prices every 
year.14 Section A of this Part examines the legislative history of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the procedure required to introduce pharmaceutical drugs to 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 116–119 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–68 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 69–115 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 116–136 and accompanying text. 
 12 See 21 U.S.C § 355 (providing opportunities for generic entry before the expiration of a 
brand’s patent life). The Act balances the competing goals of encouraging innovation and stifling 
unproductive monopolies by encouraging generic manufacturers to challenge weak or invalid patents. 
Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394 (recognizing that the Hatch-Waxman Act accomplishes this balancing act 
by enabling generics to challenge patents); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204, 217 (3d. 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that the congressional purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase compe-
tition by encouraging generic manufacturers to challenge weak patents), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013). By challenging 
such patents, generic manufacturers can introduce pharmaceutical alternatives and the public can 
enjoy lower drug prices sooner. Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394; see Brief for Rep. Henry A. Waxman as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (stating that 
the Act was enacted to respond to the increasing problem of high prescription drug prices by increas-
ing competition in the industry between brand and generic drugs). 
 13 See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 404–05 (2012) (explaining 
that the Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates an abbreviated process for generic manufacturers to enter the 
market). 
 14 See Brianna Ford, Comment, Using Reverse Payment Agreements as an Effective Way to Main-
tain a Patent Monopoly in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 919, 
949 (2013) (noting the congressional intent to lower pharmaceutical drug prices by increasing compe-
tition). The introduction of generic drugs in 1994 saved consumers $10 billion. Id. at n.244. In 2010, 
consumers paid an average copayment of $34.77 and $6.06 per prescription for brand name and ge-
neric drugs, respectively. Kang, supra note 3, at 77. 
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the market.15 Section B of this Part details the factual and procedural history in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision in Smithkline.16 
A. The Legislative Purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
A patent is the exception to the rule against monopolies.17 The Constitu-
tion’s Patent Clause grants inventors the exclusive right to their innovations for a 
limited period of time in order to promote arts and sciences.18 This exclusive 
period prevents early imitation of the patent, because the presence of multiple 
market players can greatly reduce a pioneer’s profits, and consequently, could 
discourage novel innovations.19 Nevertheless, federal patent laws recognize that 
competition, and not monopoly, is integral to the availability of low cost goods 
and services in the open market system.20 
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to create access to 
low cost generic drugs.21 The Hatch-Waxman Act expedites the approval pro-
cess in order to quickly and efficiently introduce generic drugs to the market.22 
The Act also encourages generic manufacturers to challenge weak or invalid 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 17–46 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 47–68 and accompanying text. 
 17 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). The rule 
against monopolies promotes access to a free market. Id. In turn, a patent, which grants access to an 
exclusive market, is the exception to the prohibition of monopolies because a patent is a monopoly. Id.  
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (promoting the progress of arts and sciences by providing inven-
tors the exclusive right to their inventions). 
 19 See Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394 (noting that prompt imitation from competitors would hinder 
valuable pharmaceutical development). 
 20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting contracts in restraint of free trade and competition); Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (stating that patent laws reflect the 
balance between promoting inventions, while also encouraging imitation in order to create a thriving 
economy). See generally Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 761, 762–63 (2002) (noting the tension between patent law, which allows for anticompetitive 
exclusion, and antitrust law, which prohibits such exclusion). The Patent Clause balances the need to 
promote innovation and stifle monopolies by imposing limitations on the grant of a patent. See Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (explaining the limitations on a patent’s monopoly). For example, Congress 
may not approve patent monopolies of unlimited duration, or patents that result in restricting access to 
readily available materials or removing existing knowledge from the public domain. Id. This is be-
cause the public is best served when patents do not exceed the scope of their lawful monopolies. Pre-
cision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816. 
 21 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394 (stating that the purpose of the Act is to increase the number of 
available generic drugs); see Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984; Brief 
for Rep. Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12 (noting that the 
Act was designed to solve the issue of high pharmaceutical drug prices). 
 22 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (commenting that the Act allows generics to forego expensive 
and time-consuming studies that are necessary for a pioneer drug to obtain marketing approval). The 
Hatch-Waxman Act reduces the time and costs associated with introducing a generic drug. Ford, su-
pra note 14, at 922–23 (explaining that generic manufacturers who produce a “bioequivalent” of an 
approved brand-name drug may forego the clinical testing requirements of a new drugs). 
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brand-name patents.23 The Act safeguards the competitive economy by incen-
tivizing manufacturers to create and market inexpensive pharmaceutical alter-
natives.24 
The Supreme Court identified four features of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
that effectuate the legislative purpose of providing available low cost prescrip-
tion drugs.25 First, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) must approve a 
pioneer or “brand-name” prescription drug before it is made available to the 
public.26 The approval process is very lengthy and costly.27 Brand-name drug 
manufacturers submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) that includes investi-
gative reports and comprehensive information about the drug.28 If the NDA 
demonstrates the drug is safe and effective for use, the FDA will grant the pa-
tentee marketing approval.29 
Second, a generic drug manufacturer who wishes to market a generic ver-
sion of an already approved brand-name drug may obtain marketing approval 
through an expedited process.30 Instead of an NDA, generic drug manufactur-
ers file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), certifying the ge-
neric is the “bioequivalent” of the brand-name drug.31 The abbreviated process 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394. The FDA provides an expedited process to generic manufacturers 
in order to increase the number of available generics on the market. Kelly, supra note 4, at 421. On 
average, the approval process for a New Drug Application (“NDA”) lasts fifteen years and costs $1.5 
billion. Id. at 422. For this reason, the FDA found it unnecessary and wasteful to require generics to 
undergo the full NDA process. Id. at 421. 
 24 See Ralph B. Kalfayan & Vic A. Merjanian, Ensuring Access to Affordable Medication: The 
Supreme Court’s Opinion in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., COMPETITION, Fall 2013, at 121, 125–26 (noting 
the statutory options for generic manufacturers to enter the market before the expiration of a brand’s 
patent). Pharmaceutical prices increased by thirty-three percent from 2006 to 2010, and competition is 
essential to reduce the cost of pharmaceutical drugs. Id. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives 
to increase competition for generic manufacturers and provide accessible healthcare. Id. at 121. 
 25 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227–29. 
 26 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (stating that manufacturers need FDA approval to introduce a new 
drug); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (noting the approval process necessary for introducing a drug); 
Smithkline, 791 F.3d 388 at 394–95 (recognizing approval is required before a pharmaceutical drug is 
permitted market entry). 
 27 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (outlining required submissions for ap-
plication). 
 28 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. The NDA requires, among other things, 
reports of investigations into safety and efficacy, a list of the drugs components, statement of compo-
sition, description of the facilities used in manufacturing, drug samples, and a proposed labeling sam-
ple. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 29 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (restricting marketable drugs to those with approved applications and prov-
en efficacy); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 30 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufac-
turers were required to spend millions of dollars completing separate NDAs. Ford, supra note 14, at 
923 (stating that generic manufacturers had to undergo the costly NDA approval process before the 
Act was enacted). 
 31 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). A generic is the bioequivalent of a listed drug if there is no signif-
icant difference between the rate and extent of absorption under the same dose, conditions, and ingre-
dients. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B). 
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promotes drug competition by allowing the generic to take advantage of the 
pioneer’s approval efforts.32 
Third, the Hatch-Waxman Act sets forth several methods for preventing 
and resolving patent disputes between brand and generic filers.33 Generic filers 
are required to provide the FDA assurance that the generic drug will not in-
fringe on a brand’s patents by certifying that: (I) the brand-name manufacturer 
did not file a patent, (II) the brand’s patent has expired, (III) the brand’s patent 
will expire, or (IV) the patent is invalid and/or the generic will not infringe 
upon the patent.34 
A paragraph IV certification, however, is a per se act of infringement and 
generally provokes patent litigation.35 If the brand-name patentee sues the ge-
neric for infringement within forty-five days of the paragraph IV filing, the 
FDA must withhold approval of the generic for a thirty-month stay for litiga-
tion.36 If the court makes a ruling within the thirty-month period, the FDA ad-
heres to the determination regarding the patent’s validity.37 If the matter is not 
decided within thirty months, the FDA may grant the generic marketing ap-
proval.38 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 395. The Hatch-Waxman Act speeds up the generic approval process 
by allowing bioequivalent generics to forego repeating clinical studies. David C. Kurlander, Note, 
Rebalancing Pay-for-delay: Why No-authorized Generic Agreements Should Be Subject to Higher 
Antitrust Scrutiny, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 688 (2014) (noting that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act enables generics to forego repeating the NDA clinical trials in order to increase the number of 
competitors and decrease pharmaceutical prices). ANDAs reduce the cost associated with introducing 
a generic drug from $200 million to $1 million. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1564–65, 1564 
n.36 (2006) (commenting that the cost of an ANDA is much less expensive than NDA clinical trials). 
 33 See 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1) (requiring brand applicants to list the number and expiration date of 
relevant patents); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act prevents patent 
disputes by requiring generic filers “to assure the FDA that the generic will not infringe the brand-
name’s [listed] patents”) (citation omitted). Generic manufacturers verify whether their drug will 
infringe the brand’s patents by reference to the brand’s NDA, which provides information on all pa-
tents related to the pioneer drug. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 34 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). A filer that elects the “paragraph IV” certification must 
provide a factual and legal basis stating why the patent is invalid or will not be infringed. Id. 
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). In other words, so long as the brand name’s patent is valid and relevant, the 
generic will not be approved for market. Id. 
 35 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 395 (explain-
ing that “the patent statute treats paragraph IV certification as a per se act of infringement”). A filer is 
required to notify the patent holders that its paragraph IV certification claims the patents are invalid or 
will not be infringed upon. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (providing that the brand’s patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed). 
 36 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (providing a forty-five-day window for the brand name to act in 
order to halt the generic approval process in a paragraph IV certification); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; 
Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 395. 
 37 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 395–96. 
 38 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228; Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 395–96. A 
filer that markets its generic after the thirty-month stay, but before a court judgment, may be liable for 
infringement. Kurlander, supra note 32, at 689 n.43. If the brand patentee is successful in defending 
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Fourth, the Act encourages generic manufacturers to file ANDAs with 
paragraph IV certifications to challenge weak patents.39 The first generic filer 
is granted 180 days of exclusive rights to the generic prescription drug mar-
ket.40 This exclusionary period is incredibly valuable, because generic manu-
facturers derive the majority of their profits during this time as the only market 
player.41 
Nonetheless, the exclusivity period does not prohibit the pioneer patentee 
from introducing an “authorized generic.”42 An authorized generic is a generic 
drug produced by the pioneer brand-name drug manufacturer.43 Because the 
FDA has already approved the brand name, the pioneer drug manufacturer is 
granted entry to the generic market in order to recoup lost profits as a result of 
other generic’s entry.44 The pioneer patentee, however, could choose to forego 
this right by entering into a “no-authorized generic” agreement with the first 
generic to file an ANDA.45 If the brand name and generic enter a no-AG 
agreement, the first-filing generic would remain the only generic for the 180-
day exclusivity period.46 
                                                                                                                           
his or her patent claim, and the court finds that the generic has infringed the patent, the generic manu-
facturer may not market the generic. Id. at 689. If, however, the patentee is not successful in defending 
his or her patent claim or the court otherwise finds that the patent has not been infringed, the generic 
manufacturer may bring the generic to market under the ANDA rules. Id. (noting that the thirty-month 
stay is lifted at the earlier of the court rendering a verdict regarding the validity of the patent or the 
expiration of thirty months). 
 39 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228–29; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 217; see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (granting the first-filing generic a 180-day period of exclusivity). 
 40 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (noting that no other generic manufacturers can compete during the 
period of exclusivity). The first-filing generic manufacturer is the only generic eligible to receive the 
exclusivity period, even if the first filer withdraws, settles, or loses the infringement lawsuit and never 
introduces its generic drug. Kurlander, supra note 32, at 689. 
 41 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (stating that the majority of the first-filing generic’s profits are 
derived during the 180-day period of exclusivity). The entry of another generic manufacturer forces 
the first-filing generic to reduce its prices by fifty percent. Ford, supra note 14, at 949 n.243. 
 42 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 396 (commenting that the period of exclusivity only excludes other 
generic manufacturers and does not exclude the brand patentee from introducing his or her own gener-
ic). There is a duopoly between the brand and the first-filing generic during the exclusivity period. 
Kurlander, supra note 32, at 689. 
 43 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig. (Esomeprazole I), 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 379 (D. 
Mass. 2013) (explaining that an authorized generic is the equivalent of the brand-name drug marketed 
under a generic label). 
 44 See id. (noting that the authorized generic need not satisfy FDA approval because the FDA 
already approved the brand-name drug and the generic is its equivalent). 
 45 Id. A no-AG agreement enables the first-filing generic to enjoy the 180-day exclusivity period 
sans competition from the patentee’s authorized generic. Id. Brand-name manufacturers agree not to 
introduce an authorized generic and generics agree to drop their claim. Kurlander, supra note 32, at 
693. 
 46 Kurlander, supra note 32, at 695–96. In exchange, the brand retains its patent for its natural 
life, protecting the brand’s monopoly until the summation of the patent’s term and the first-filing 
generic’s 180 days. Id. 
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B. District Court Approves Settlement Agreement in Which Pioneer 
Manufacturer Agrees Not to Introduce an Authorized Generic 
In Smithkline, plaintiffs, direct purchasers of the brand-name drug Lamictal, 
a drug used to treat epilepsy and bipolar disorder, commenced a putative class 
action lawsuit against defendant Smithkline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”).47 Plain-
tiffs alleged that the settlement agreement between GSK, Lamictal’s producer, 
and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (“Teva”), a Lamictal generic manufac-
turer, violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.48 
GSK pioneered Lamictal and sells the brand-name drug in chewable and 
non-chewable tablet form.49 In order to obtain marketing approval, GSK ob-
tained patent No. 4,602,017 (“‘017 patent”) on lamotrigine, the active ingredient 
in Lamictal.50 The ‘017 patent expired on July 22, 2008.51 
In April 2002, Teva filed an ANDA to market generic lamotrigine chewa-
bles and non-chewable tablets.52 As assurance to the FDA, Teva certified in par-
agraph IV that the generic would not infringe upon GSK’s ‘017 patent and/or 
that the ‘017 patent was unenforceable.53 In response, GSK sued Teva for patent 
infringement, thereby delaying the FDA’s generic approval process for the antic-
ipated thirty-month litigation period.54 A jury-waived trial commenced in federal 
court in January 2005.55 District Judge Bissell ruled that GSK’s main patent 
claim for the invention of lamotrigine was invalid.56 The parties settled, howev-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 393, 396–98. King Drug Co. of Florence Inc. and Louisiana Wholesale 
Drug Co. Inc. led the putative class. Id. at 396. Defendant is referred to as GSK because SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. does business as GlaxoSmithKline following the merger between GlaxoWellcome 
and SmithKline Beecham in 2001. Id. at 393; Our History, GSK, http://www.gsk.com/en-gb/about-
us/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/ZYP3-CBKE]. 
 48 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (prohibiting unreasonable restraints on trade); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 393, 
405 (noting that antitrust law is intended to protect consumers from anticompetitive market arrange-
ments). 
 49 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 396–97. Although GSK sells both chewable and non-chewable tablets, 
the majority of Lamictal prescriptions are for non-chewable tablets. Id. Indeed, between March 2007 
and 2008, tablet sales measured in excess of $2 billion whereas chewable sales in 2005 were around 
$50 million. Id. 
 50 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 396; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (requiring the NDA application to 
include the patent number, among other things, before the brand drug can be approved for sale). 
 51 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 396. 
 52 Id. at 397. Teva was the first generic to file an ANDA. Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. As part of the ANDA process, generic manufacturers are required to notify brand-name 
patent holders of their paragraph IV certification. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (stating that the ANDA 
application requires the generic manufacturer to submit notice to the brand-name manufacturer). 
 55 See In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 561 (D. N.J. 2014) 
(laying out the facts of the patent dispute underlying the antitrust claim), vacated, Smithkline, 791 
F.3d at 397 (noting that the parties settled the patent dispute before the conclusion of the trial). 
 56 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. 
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er, in February 2005 before Judge Bissell could enter judgment on the validity of 
the patent.57 
In the February 2005 settlement, GSK agreed to allow Teva to market ge-
neric lamotrigine chewable and non-chewable tablets.58 According to the agree-
ment, Teva was permitted to sell generic chewables no later than June 1, 2005, 
thirty-seven months before the ‘017 patent’s expiration date on July 22, 2008.59 
GSK also permitted Teva to market generic tablets on July 21, 2008 or March 1, 
2008.60 As part of the “no-AG agreement,” GSK also agreed to withhold mar-
keting its authorized generic until January 2009, after Teva’s 180-day exclusivity 
period ended.61 The settlement agreement ensured that Teva could take ad-
vantage of its entire statutory exclusivity period without any generic competi-
tion.62 
In exchange, Teva dropped the lawsuit challenging the validity of the ‘017 
patent.63 Plaintiffs allege that Teva agreed to delay introducing their own generic 
lamotrigine tablet in exchange for the no-AG agreement.64 Otherwise, plaintiffs 
allege, Teva would have proceeded to market a lamotrigine generic tablet “at 
risk” in the unlikely event the district judge found the remaining patent claims 
valid.65 Teva confirmed the allegations by noting that GSK’s no-AG agreement 
was an integral part of the settlement and induced Teva to abandon its patent 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See id. (stating that the parties settled the patent dispute before District Judge Bissell issued a 
ruling on the remaining patent claims). Plaintiffs alleged Teva would be successful with the remaining 
patent claims given District Judge Bissell’s finding that the first patent claim was invalid. See id. (not-
ing that the remaining patents were extremely weak given District Judge Bissell’s ruling that the main 
patent was invalid). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. GSK agreed to supply Teva with lamotrigine chewables because the FDA had not yet ap-
proved Teva’s ANDAs. Id. at 397 n.12. 
 60 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(c)(2)(B); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. GSK agreed to permit Teva to market 
generic tablets on July 21, 2008, if the FDA granted GSK a “pediatric exclusivity” extension, which 
stays the FDA generic approval process for six months so long as the brand-name patentee submits 
studies relating to the pediatric population. Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397 & 397 n.13. If GSK did not 
receive a pediatric exclusivity extension, GSK agreed to allow Teva to introduce generic tablets five 
months prior on March 21, 2008. Id. 
 61 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397.  
 62 See id. (noting that the 180-day period would have begun upon a final court judgment, regard-
less of whether Teva was ready to market its generic at that time). The period of exclusivity was partic-
ularly advantageous to Teva, because the 180 days would have commenced as soon as the court issued a 
final judgment, even though the FDA could not approve Teva’s ANDAs until after the thirty-month stay. 
Id. The FDA could not approve Teva’s ANDAs for thirty months because GSK commenced litigation 
within forty-five days of Teva’s paragraph IV certification. Id. at 395, 397. 
 63 Id. at 397 
 64 Id. 
 65 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). A pharmaceutical manufacturer 
launches a generic drug “at risk” if the manufacturer markets the generic with FDA approval after the 
thirty-month stay, but before the patent litigation is completed. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Anti-
trust Litig. (Esomeprazole II), 309 F.R.D. 107, 113 (D. Mass. 2015). Teva received FDA approval in 
August 2006. Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. 
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litigation.66 The district judge approved the settlement and the case was dis-
missed on April 4, 2005.67 As a result of the settlement, GSK maintained its pa-
tent-protected monopoly, based on a putatively invalid patent claim, for three 
years.68 
II. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES IN PATENT  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
In 2015, in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey’s dismissal of the action.69 The 
Third Circuit held that no-AG agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny be-
cause of their monopolistic consequences.70 The court relied on Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, a 2013 decision in which the United States Supreme 
Court held that patent settlements involving cash payments to alleged infring-
ers are subject to antitrust scrutiny.71 Section A of this Part discusses the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Actavis.72 Section B of this Part discusses the ex-
tension of the Actavis reasoning to non-cash settlements in Smithkline.73 
A. Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements Are Subject to Antitrust 
Scrutiny Under the Rule of Reason 
Antitrust and intellectual property law are often in conflict, given their 
competing goals of prohibiting and protecting monopolies.74 Antitrust laws pro-
                                                                                                                           
 66 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 397. 
 67 Id. at 398. 
 68 Id. at 397. 
 69 King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 399, 404, 413 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 70 Id. at 405 (explaining the anticompetitive consequences of no-AG settlement agreements). 
 71 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 394. In Actavis, a generic manufacturer 
initiated paragraph IV litigation to market a generic version of the brand drug. Id. at 2229. The parties 
settled in 2006, the generic manufacturers agreed to delay entering the generic market until 2015, and 
the brand-name manufacturer paid the three generic manufacturers $12 million, $60 million, and $19–
30 million annually, respectively. Id. 
 72 See infra notes 74–102 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 
B.C. L. REV. 905, 919–20 (2010) (articulating the conflict that arises due to the differing statutory 
goals to prohibit and promote monopolies); Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1556–57 (noting that drug 
manufacturer settlements typically present antitrust violations); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust 
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1817 (1984) (“A practice is typically deemed to 
violate the antitrust laws because it is anticompetitive. But the very purpose of a patent grant is to 
reward the patentee by limiting competition . . . .”). 
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scribe various anticompetitive arrangements in the marketplace.75 Sections one 
and two of the Sherman Act prohibit unreasonable restraints on trade and the 
monopolization of trade or commerce.76 The sections work in conjunction to 
condemn concentrated market power and wealth.77 Conversely, patent law ex-
pressly endorses monopolizing the market.78 Patent holders are provided the ex-
clusive right to their inventions and corresponding profits in order to encourage 
innovation.79 Deciphering the appropriate intersection between antitrust and pa-
tent law is a question many courts and scholars grappled with until the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Actavis.80 
The Court in Actavis held that “reverse payment” settlement agreements 
are subject to antitrust scrutiny.81 Reverse payment settlements typically occur 
when a brand-name manufacturer files a lawsuit against a generic manufactur-
er for patent infringement.82 Instead of litigating the validity of the brand’s pa-
tent, the parties settle.83 Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the pa-
tentee pays the alleged infringer to abstain from introducing a generic until the 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (prohibiting unreasonable restraints on trade and 
monopolies in the marketplace); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 404 (stating that antitrust law promotes com-
petition and protects consumers from anti-competitive monopolies). 
 76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspira-
cy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal.”); id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
 77 See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 560 (2012) 
(stating that the Sherman Act was a response to concentrated wealth). The Sherman Act has many 
purposes: to prevent the concentration of markets, to protect freedom of trade, to promote consumer 
welfare, and to prohibit anticompetitive practices. Id. at 560–61. Due to the overall policy of promot-
ing freedom of trade, the Sherman Act is often regarded as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise.” 
Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1555 (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 
(1972)). 
 78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting inventors the exclusive right to their inventions). 
 79 See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 87 (2010) (noting that patent owners are afforded exclusive 
rights to their inventions in order to encourage innovation); Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1562 (“[A] 
patent is considered necessary to recoup an initial investment.”). 
 80 See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L. J. 1483, 1489 (2015) (acknowledging 
that the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law is a common source of conflict). Prior to 
Actavis, some scholars suggested a patent was an absolute right to exclude, whereas others argued 
patent rights must remain within the confines of antitrust law. Id. 
 81 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade or 
commerce). The Sherman Act protects consumers from unfair trade practices that impede competition. 
Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 405. 
 82 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227; Supreme Court 2012 Term: Leading Cases: Hatch-Waxman Act—
Reverse-Payment Settlements—FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 127 HARV. L. REV. 358, 358 (2013) (noting that 
reverse payment settlements compensate generic drug manufacturers for staying out of the market). 
 83 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
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patent expires.84 Thus, the agreement is referred to as a reverse payment set-
tlement agreement because the patentee, who initiated the lawsuit to defend the 
validity of its patent, pays the alleged patent infringer.85 
Prior to the landmark decision in Actavis, lower courts generally applied 
the “scope of the patent” test and found that Hatch-Waxman related settle-
ments were immune from antitrust scrutiny.86 The scope of the patent test as-
sumes that, because a patent holder is entitled to a monopoly within the scope 
of its patent, liability under the Sherman Act for monopolistic behavior is in-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. (stating that the brand pays the generic “millions of dollars”). The Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”) has determined that reverse settlement amounts range from $1.75 million to $132.5 
million. Marlee P. Kutcher, Comment, Waiting Is the Hardest Part: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Adopt the Third Circuit’s Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1093, 1102–03 n.54 (2013) (stating that nine out of twenty settlements involved payments from the 
brand to the generic). For example, Bayer paid a generic paragraph IV filer a total of $398.1 million, 
including an initial $49.1 million payout to drop its litigation. Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as 
Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 281, 299 (2011). 
 85 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. Reverse payment agreements are also referred to as pay-for-delay 
settlement agreements, because the brand-name manufacturer compensates the generic drug manufac-
turer to delay market entry. Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse Payment Settlements—The Agenda for 
Courts and the Legislature After the Supreme Court’s Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 105, 107 (2013). In general, a brand manufacturer agrees to pay the generic manufacturer in 
order to protect the length of its patent, and consequently, the brand’s expected profits in a monopoly 
setting. Kendyl Hanks et al., “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements: Antitrust Violation or Proper Exercise of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Rights? AM. B. (Jan. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/
2011/01/02_hanks.html [https://perma.cc/BZB5-JPQS]. Although costly, these arrangements provide 
the brand-name manufacturer higher expected profits, because the presence of a generic provides 
consumers a lower cost option, and therefore, forces the brand to reduce its inflated costs. See id. 
(commenting that reverse payments extend the brand’s patent term and expected profits without ge-
neric competition). 
 86 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31; see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 
1298, 1307–09 (11th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging that paying a potential competitor to refrain from 
entering the market violates antitrust principles, but holding that the agreement was lawfully within 
the scope of the patent because a patent grants the right to exclude others from the marketplace), 
rev’d, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1233–34 
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that a settlement agreement is immune from antitrust attack unless there is 
proof of sham litigation or fraudulence). The scope of the patent test originated in the Sixth Circuit’s 
2003 decision in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, where the court rejected a settlement ar-
rangement to pay the brand’s only competitor $40 million per year not to enter the generic market, 
because the agreement restricted market entry of the generic and other drugs unrelated to the generic’s 
ANDA. 332 F.3d 896, 905–08 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing various scenarios that would be per se ille-
gal as restrictions on market entry beyond the scope of the patent); Michael A. Carrier, Why the 
“Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2012). The court characterized the arrangement as per se illegal because the restrictions on 
trade were plainly outside the scope of the patent. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 900. 
The scope of the patent test evolved in 2006 in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, where the 
Second Circuit appeared to immunize behavior within the scope of the patent, as opposed to proscrib-
ing behavior outside the scope of the patent. Carrier, supra, at 3; see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that exclusionary behavior within the scope of a 
patent it not unlawful), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct 2223. 
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appropriate.87 The scope of the patent analysis considered the exclusionary 
potential of the patent, the extent to which the terms of the settlement exceed 
the scope, and any resulting anticompetitive consequences.88 Thus, a reverse 
payment settlement did not result in antitrust liability if the anticompetitive 
consequences fell within the rights and privileges conferred by patent.89 
In Actavis, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this view and held that re-
verse payment agreements can violate antitrust principles, notwithstanding the 
agreement is in accord with the patent’s scope.90 Justice Breyer, writing for the 
Court, adopted the “rule-of-reason” test that considers both patent and antitrust 
factors to determine whether the settlement imposes an unreasonable restraint 
on trade.91 The analysis balances the exclusionary privileges afforded to the 
patentee with the prohibition of monopolies under the Sherman Act.92 If the 
anticompetitive effects outweigh the benefits conferred by the patent, the set-
tlement is subject to antitrust liability.93 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Carrier, supra note 86, at 1–2 (stating that the analysis for the scope of the patent test con-
siders whether a settlement arrangement is within the scope of the patent, and if it is, the arrangement 
does not violate antitrust laws). 
 88 See Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 399, 401 (noting that a patent’s scope is ascertained by reference to 
patent law). 
 89 See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2003) (recog-
nizing that patents are the exception to the rule against monopolies, but limiting the exception to the 
terms of the patent grant and statutory rights). 
 90 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237, 2239 (acknowledging that reverse payment settlements 
are not per se unlawful, but lawfulness should be assessed by considering all of the circumstances 
under the rule of reason test). The scope of the patent test has also been subject to criticism due to the 
fact that it presumes validity. See Carrier, supra note 86, at 6 (condemning the test’s simplistic nature 
in assuming validity). For instance, if a patent is invalid, as is often the case in these settlement ar-
rangements, it should not be entitled to the scope of the patent test, because the patent itself is invalid 
and thus does not have any scope. See id. (commenting that courts ignore the likely possibility that the 
patent is invalid, and therefore, inappropriately apply a scope analysis to an invalid patent).  
 91 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237; Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 401. The Court explicitly rejected the 
FTC’s proposition of a per se test where the settlement is presumed unlawful, and the settling parties 
must offer evidence to the contrary to show precompetitive effects. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. In 
rejecting this approach and adopting the rule of reason test, however, the Court left open the question 
of how to apply the rule of reason standard for lower courts. See id. at 2238 (instructing lower courts 
to decide how to construct the rule of reason analysis). In response, Joshua D. Wright, the Commis-
sioner of the FTC, noted that the Actavis holding is not a complete victory for the FTC and remarked 
on the difficult task ahead for lower courts in applying the rule of reason test without an exhaustive 
list of factors to consider. Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, FTC, Intellectual Property Rights, Trun-
cation, and Actavis: Who’s Afraid of the Rule of Reason?, Remarks at the Competition Review Live 
2d Annual IP & Antitrust USA (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 92 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. The rule of reason inquiry balances the economic benefits resulting 
from the agreement and the detrimental anticompetitive consequences. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) 
Antitrust Litig. (Esomeprazole I), 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 387 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 93 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 401. 
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The Court articulated several considerations in favor of adopting the rule-
of-reason test over the scope of the patent test.94 First, reverse payment settle-
ments can adversely effect competition.95 The generic manufacturer is com-
pensated to forgo its Hatch-Waxman right to enter the market prior to the pa-
tent expiration date.96 As such, the brand manufacturer remains the only mar-
ket player and consumers do not have a choice but to pay the patentee’s su-
pracompetitive prices.97 Second, the settlement’s anticompetitive consequences 
may be unjustified.98 A payment is unjustified if it proportionally exceeds the 
benefits of settlement, because this suggests the patent holder is compensating 
the alleged infringer to stay out of the market.99 Third, the size of the payment 
is a strong indicator that the patentee possesses the market power to deter the 
generic from entering the market.100 Fourth, a large payment may imply the 
patentee lacks confidence in the patent’s validity and is over-compensating to 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234; Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 402. The brand and generic maximize their 
profits by delaying entry because monopoly profits are greater than duopoly profits. Edlin et al., supra 
note 2, at 590–91. 
 95 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234; Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 402. The payment to delay market entry is 
anticompetitive because it preserves a monopoly. Edlin et al., supra note 2, at 590–91. The Court 
noted that the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase competition, not deny it. Actavis, 133 
S. Ct. at 2234. Accordingly, the Act was enacted to deter pharmaceutical companies from engaging in 
collusive agreements that delay the introduction of lower cost generic drugs. Id. 
 96 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. Earlier entry by the generic manufacturer benefits consumers be-
cause it creates competition. Lars P. Taavola, Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch—Insight into How 
Courts May Structure Reverse Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis Left 
Unanswered, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1370, 1381–82 (2014) (recognizing the anticompetitive 
effects when a generic agrees not to enter the market). 
 97 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–35. According to the FTC, “reverse payment settlements cost con-
sumers about $3.5 billion per year” as a result of higher drug prices. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1302. A pay-
for-delay agreement eliminates the possibility of competition during the patent’s lifetime. Edlin et al., 
supra note 2, 589–91 (explaining that a generic agrees not to enter the market for a set period of time 
in a reverse payment settlement). 
 98 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235–36 (explaining that a settlement’s anticompetitive consequenc-
es are unjustified if the purpose of the settlement is to exclude competition). 
 99 Id. at 2236. In Actavis, the parties would have saved an estimate $2.75 million in litigation 
expenses by settling versus the $20–30 million per year that Actavis received from the settlement. 
Taavola, supra note 96, at 1383. Such an arrangement raises antitrust concerns because the settlement 
provides a private benefit at the consumers’ expense. See Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1572 (discuss-
ing the FTC’s concern that pay-for-delay settlement arrangements violate antitrust principles because 
the agreement privately benefits the parties involved and imposes significant costs to consumers in the 
form of high pharmaceutical prices). A brand name, when faced with possible generic competition, 
could choose to lower prices or improve design. Id. at 1568. Instead, in a pay-for-delay settlement, the 
brand limits generic entry and, correspondingly, any possible benefit to consumers. See id. at 1572 
(noting that these characteristics of a pay-for-delay settlement constitute a quintessential example of a 
Sherman Act violation). 
 100 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. Market power can be inferred if the payment exceeds the antici-
pated cost of litigation. Edlin et al., supra note 2, at 590. The Court also inferred market power by 
relying on FTC studies that found that reverse payment agreements correspond with “higher-than-
competitive profits.” Taavola, supra note 96, at 1384. 
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prevent the risk of invalidation.101 These considerations promote competition 
and, the Court reasoned, outweigh the single consideration of promoting set-
tlement.102 
B. The Third Circuit’s Decision to Apply Antitrust Scrutiny to No-
Authorized Generic Agreements in Accordance with the  
Supreme Court Decision 
In 2015, in Smithkline, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
ruled that no-AG agreements are also subject to antitrust scrutiny under the 
rule of reason.103 Judge Scirica, writing for the court, extended Actavis’s hold-
ing to include no-AG agreements, despite the fact that no-AG agreements do 
not include cash payments.104 Nevertheless, the Smithkline court analogized 
no-AG agreements to reverse-payment settlements because both represent an 
unjustifiably large transfer of value from the patentee to the alleged patent in-
fringer.105 
For instance, the no-AG agreement in Smithkline provided Teva the ex-
clusive right to the 180-day period without competition from both the brand 
manufacturer and other generic manufacturers.106 Thus, the no-AG agreement 
affords the first generic the brand’s unrealized generic profits and opportunity 
to set supracompetitive prices as the only generic market player.107 Indeed, the 
exclusivity period is the primary source of the first filer’s profits, which can 
amount to several hundred million dollars.108 Therefore, the no-AG agreement 
represents a large transfer of value, albeit non-monetary.109 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37 (explaining that a patentee who doubts the patent’s survival 
may compensate the generic to avoid the risk that litigation will invalidate the patent, thus allowing 
the brand and generic to enjoy supracompetive prices rather than face a competitive market). 
 102 Id. at 2237. The rule of reason test results in more litigation and less settlement than the scope 
of the patent test. Ford, supra note 14, at 928–29. The latter benefits the patent holder because it in-
volves only patent, and not antitrust, principles. Id. at 928. 
 103 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 403. 
 104 Id. Unlike the cash payments made by the brand manufacturer in Actavis, no-AG agreements 
are characterized as non-cash settlements, because the value exchanged in the settlement is intangible 
and not a cash payment. Edlin et al., supra note 2, at 592–93 (commenting that though the “cash pay-
ment” in Actavis dealt with the exchange of money, there are other forms of payment, such as a stock 
transfer). Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in Actavis, opined regretfully that the Court’s rule of rea-
son test could subject non-cash as well as cash settlements to antitrust. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2245 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 105 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 403–04 (stating that no-AG agreements, although non-cash, present 
similar problems as reverse-payment cash settlements). 
 106 Id. at 404. 
 107 Id. at 405. 
 108 Id. The Smithkline court noted that the presence of another market player would adversely 
impact Teva’s sales and require Teva to reduce the price of its generic. Id. at 404 n.21. On average, a 
first-filing generic enters the market at a twenty percent discount, but after the period of exclusivity 
ends, the generic is priced at an eighty to eighty-five percent discount from the brand’s price. Robin 
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In addition, the Smithkline court reasoned that no-AG agreements result 
in monopolistic consequences.110 Similar to reverse payments, a brand manu-
facturer can leverage the value of a no-AG agreement to induce the generic 
manufacturer to abandon its claim disputing the patent’s validity.111 This elim-
inates the risk that the patent is invalidated, and, consequently, the patentee 
continues to benefit from a brand monopoly.112 Similarly, the generic manufac-
turer reaps the profits of a generic monopoly.113 Thus, the no-AG agreement 
enables the brand and generic to share in the monopoly profits, but prevents 
consumers to benefit from a more competitive market.114 In conclusion, the 
Smithkline court ruled that the no-AG agreement represents a large, unex-
plained transfer of value with antitrust effects that should be evaluated under 
the rule of reason.115 
III. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY EFFECTUATES THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE TO 
PROMOTE COMPETITION AND PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM  
HIGH PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG PRICES 
In June 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. correctly held that no-
AG agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason test.116 
First, this Part argues that the Smithkline decision is in line with Congress’s 
                                                                                                                           
Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 500–01 (2016). 
 109 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 405. 
 110 Id. In no-AG agreements, the first-filing generic is able to set generic prices higher than would 
be possible with the presence of two generic drugs. Kang, supra note 3, at 79. The arrangement en-
sures the brand retains its patent period for the length of the agreement, which would be in jeopardy if 
the parties continued to litigate. See Michael A. Carrier, Eight Reasons Why “No-Authorized-
Generic” Promises Constitute Payment, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 697, 719 (2015) (arguing that no-AG 
agreements provide the brand an extended period of exclusive profits). In turn, the generic is entitled 
to a 180-day period of exclusivity. Id. The settlement thus violates antitrust principles because the 
arrangement decreases competition and increases profits for the parties involved at the expense of 
consumers. Id. 
 111 Carrier, supra note 110, at 719. 
 112 Id. The brand maintains its monopoly to continue marketing the brand drug. Feldman & Fron-
dorf, supra note 108, at 522. 
 113 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 405; Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 108, at 500–01 (stating that a first-
filing generic enters the market at a twenty percent discount and an eighty to eighty-five percent discount 
from the price of the brand-name drug during and after the period of exclusivity, respectively). 
 114 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 405. 
 115 Id. at 409. 
 116 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (stating that a large and 
unjustified payment to an alleged infringer risks anticompetitive effects and is subject to antitrust 
liability); King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that Actavis is not limited to cash settlements). 
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intent to promote competition in the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act.117 
Next, this Part argues that no-AG agreements should be evaluated in the same 
manner as cash reverse-payments at issue in the 2013 United States Supreme 
Court decision Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis.118 Finally, this Part ar-
gues that the economic benefits derived from a competitive pharmaceutical 
market outweigh the potential benefits of promoting settlement.119 
First, the Smithkline ruling effectuates the congressional intent to increase 
competition with the Hatch-Waxman Act.120 The Third Circuit correctly held 
that no-AG agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny because, similar to re-
verse payment agreements, no-AG agreements limit the number of available 
generics in the market to one.121 In the reverse payment context, generics agree 
not to enter the market.122 In no-AG agreements, brands agree not to enter the 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d. Cir. 2012) (explaining that the goal of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act is to promote competition by encouraging generic manufacturers to challenge 
weak or invalid patents), vacated and remanded sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale 
Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013); infra notes 120–125 and accompanying text. The Hatch-Waxman 
Act incentivizes the production of low-cost drugs by streamlining the generic approval process and 
encouraging generics to challenge brand patents. Kurlander, supra note 32, at 690. 
 118 See 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (holding that a reverse payment, when large and unjustified, is subject 
to antitrust review under the rule of reason); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 404 (noting that the exclusivity 
period and authorized generics are worth several hundreds of millions of dollars); Taavola, supra note 
96, at 1389 (noting that some courts interpret Actavis to include non-monetary payments); infra notes 
126–132 and accompanying text. 
 119 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234, 2237 (recognizing the value of settlements but nonetheless 
concluding that the antitrust concerns outweigh the benefits of settlement); infra notes 133–136 and 
accompanying text. In Actavis, the Court reasoned that the general policy to promote settlement of 
disputes is not dispositive to resolving the antitrust issue. See id. at 2237 (holding that the anticom-
petitive consequences outweigh the single consideration of desirability of settlements); Kurlander, 
supra note 32, at 692–93 (noting the Actavis Court held that the general policy of promoting settle-
ments should not solely determine the result of whether the settlement arrangement violates antitrust 
principles). 
 120 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 217 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act encour-
ages patent challenges in order to increase the availability of generic drugs in the market). The Act 
protects consumers from excessive pharmaceutical drug prices by incentivizing generics to challenge 
weak patents. See Allison A. Schmitt, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment 
Settlements After Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 498–99 
(2014) (stating that the Act is designed to increase competition and decrease the price of pharmaceuti-
cal drugs). No-AG agreements limit competition, because the brand agrees not to market an author-
ized generic in exchange for the generic’s willingness to delay market entry. See Carrier, supra note 
110, at 717–20 (“[T]hese reciprocal market-division promises are even more anticompetitive than 
cash payments for delayed entry . . . . [C]ash payments (1) delay generic entry. But no-AG agreements 
(1) delay generic entry and (2) reduce generic competition after entry.”). 
 121 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (explaining that reverse payment settlement agreements com-
pensate the generic manufacturer to delay entering the market); Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 393 (explain-
ing that brand-name manufacturers refrain from introducing their own generic in no-AG agreements). 
 122 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (“Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two 
companies settle under the terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the 
patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many 
millions of dollars.”). 
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generic market.123 Though the terms of the agreements may differ, the result is 
the same—less competition and consequently higher prices for the consum-
er.124 Therefore, antitrust scrutiny is appropriate because no-AGs stifle the 
congressional purpose of increasing the number of available low cost generic 
drugs on the market.125 
Second, no-AG agreements represent a large transfer of value that should 
be evaluated under the rule of reason.126 The 180-day exclusivity period can be 
worth several hundred million dollars and comprises the majority of the first-
filer’s profits.127 In fact, in Smithkline, Teva’s generic sales were an astounding 
$671 million during the length of the no-AG agreement.128 Reduced competi-
tion from the brand name further compensates the generic manufacturer.129 The 
presence of an authorized generic drug reduces the generic manufacturer’s ex-
pected revenues by forty to fifty percent.130 Even though no cash is exchanged, 
no-AG agreements represent a large transfer of value because the generic 
manufacturer is able to enjoy generic monopoly profits.131 To rule otherwise 
would disservice Actavis and allow pharmaceutical drug manufacturers to 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 393. 
 124 Id. at 403–04 (noting that reverse settlement and no-AG agreements prevent competition and 
negatively affect consumer welfare). No-AG agreements and reverse settlements both eliminate com-
petition and result in higher generic prices. Kurlander, supra note 32, at 695. The settlements enable 
the brand to charge higher prices until the generic enters the market at the agreed upon date, at which 
time the generic is able to charge higher prices free from generic or authorized generic competition. 
Id. 
 125 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates competition 
and was not designed to encourage deals between brand and generics that delay competition). 
 126 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 404. Even though cash is not exchanged, no-AG agreements represent 
a large transfer of value. Kang, supra note 3, at 90–92 (recognizing that pharmaceutical settlements 
often involve non-cash consideration as value); see Carrier, supra note 110, at 706 (arguing that the 
Actavis holding did not limit its application to “cash,” and instead used “millions of dollars” on a 
number of occasions to anticipate its broader application to non-cash payments). 
 127 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 405. Brand-name manufacturers estimate generic deterrence is worth 
$3.9 billion and generics estimate their right to market entry at $748.6 million. Schmitt, supra note 
118, at 498 n.37. 
 128 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 404. 
 129 See id. at 404–05 & 404 n.21 (commenting that no-AG agreements create a generic monopoly 
instead of a generic duopoly). 
 130 See id. at 404 n.21 (stating that the presence of an authorized generic forces a generic to re-
duce its price and revenues decline by as much as fifty-two percent). The generic’s entry into the 
market causes the brand to lose eighty to ninety percent of its market share within a year. Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 108, at 501 (commenting that, because a generic is priced at an eighty percent 
discount to the brand name, a brand manufacturer loses an average of eighty to ninety percent of its 
market share within one year of generic introduction). 
 131 Smithkline, 791 F.3d at 404; see Brief for Petitioner at 11, Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. King 
Drug Co. of Florence, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (No. 15-1055) (noting that both a reverse settlement and 
no-AG agreement restrict competition and the anticompetitive risk is the same whether the considera-
tion is made in cash or non-cash form). 
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creatively avoid antitrust scrutiny by disguising valuable compensation 
through non-cash means.132 
Third, the congressional intent to promote competition clearly outweighs 
the need for settlement.133 It is undeniable that the risk of antitrust scrutiny 
may deter settlements, thereby requiring some parties to fully litigate their dis-
putes.134 Indeed, consumers benefit from the quick resolution of disputes, but 
consumers do not benefit from settlements that promote monopolies and su-
pracompetitive prices.135 Therefore, antitrust scrutiny ultimately promotes effi-
ciency by ensuring settlements do not eliminate beneficial competition.136 
CONCLUSION 
In 2015, in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly ruled that no-AG agreements are sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason. Allowing such scrutiny effec-
tuates the congressional objective of promoting competition under the Hatch-
Waxman Act and increasing the number of affordable generic drugs on the 
market. Although a patent grants the patentee the right to exclude, it does not 
afford the patentee unlimited rights to the market. Accordingly, a patent set-
tlement, cash or non-cash, that limits the number of available drugs on the 
market obliterates the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act and potentially vio-
lates antitrust principles. Therefore, the Third Circuit in Smithkline correctly 
applied antitrust principles to determine whether the no-AG agreement was an 
unreasonable restraint on trade. 
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 132 See Kang, supra note 3, at 90–92 (reciting Joshua Wright’s, the former Commissioner of the 
Federal Trade Commission, statements that Actavis includes non-cash compensation). Consideration 
in patent settlements takes form in a variety of complex ways, and it would be arbitrary to draw a 
distinction between cash and non-cash settlements. Id. 
 133 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 134 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 217 (acknowledging that the rule of reason test may 
limit parties’ ability to reach settlements because such settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny). 
 135 See id. (noting that monopolistic settlement agreements benefit the parties but are detrimental 
to the consumer). According to the FTC, pay-for-delay settlements cost consumers and the federal 
government $3.5 billion to $12 billion a year. Schmitt, supra note 118, at 502. 
 136 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 217 (explaining that anticompetitive settlements 
undermine the congressional purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
